[Web] Update composer deps
This commit is contained in:
andryyy
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
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Please disclose any security issues or vulnerabilities found through [Tidelift's coordinated disclosure system](https://tidelift.com/security) or to the maintainers privately.
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PHPMailer 6.4.1 and earlier contain a vulnerability that can result in untrusted code being called (if such code is injected into the host project's scope by other means). If the `$patternselect` parameter to `validateAddress()` is set to `'php'` (the default, defined by `PHPMailer::$validator`), and the global namespace contains a function called `php`, it will be called in preference to the built-in validator of the same name. Mitigated in PHPMailer 6.5.0 by denying the use of simple strings as validator function names. Recorded as [CVE-2021-3603](https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-3603). Reported by [Vikrant Singh Chauhan](mailto:vi@hackberry.xyz) via [huntr.dev](https://www.huntr.dev/).
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PHPMailer versions 6.4.1 and earlier contain a possible remote code execution vulnerability through the `$lang_path` parameter of the `setLanguage()` method. If the `$lang_path` parameter is passed unfiltered from user input, it can be set to [a UNC path](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/io/file-path-formats#unc-paths), and if an attacker is also able to persuade the server to load a file from that UNC path, a script file under their control may be executed. This vulnerability only applies to systems that resolve UNC paths, typically only Microsoft Windows.
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PHPMailer 6.5.0 mitigates this by no longer treating translation files as PHP code, but by parsing their text content directly. This approach avoids the possibility of executing unknown code while retaining backward compatibility. This isn't ideal, so the current translation format is deprecated and will be replaced in the next major release. Recorded as [CVE-2021-34551](https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-34551). Reported by [Jilin Diting Information Technology Co., Ltd](https://listensec.com) via Tidelift.
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PHPMailer versions between 6.1.8 and 6.4.0 contain a regression of the earlier CVE-2018-19296 object injection vulnerability as a result of [a fix for Windows UNC paths in 6.1.8](https://github.com/PHPMailer/PHPMailer/commit/e2e07a355ee8ff36aba21d0242c5950c56e4c6f9). Recorded as [CVE-2020-36326](https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2020-36326). Reported by Fariskhi Vidyan via Tidelift. 6.4.1 fixes this issue, and also enforces stricter checks for URL schemes in local path contexts.
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PHPMailer versions 6.1.5 and earlier contain an output escaping bug that occurs in `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` when filenames passed into `addAttachment` and other methods that accept attachment names contain double quote characters, in contravention of RFC822 3.4.1. No specific vulnerability has been found relating to this, but it could allow file attachments to bypass attachment filters that are based on matching filename extensions. Recorded as [CVE-2020-13625](https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2020-13625). Reported by Elar Lang of Clarified Security.
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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6.4.1
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6.5.0
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@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ $PHPMAILER_LANG['instantiate'] = 'لا يمكن توفير خدمة ا
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['invalid_address'] = 'الإرسال غير ممكن لأن عنوان البريد الإلكتروني غير صالح: ';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['mailer_not_supported'] = ' برنامج الإرسال غير مدعوم.';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['provide_address'] = 'يجب توفير عنوان البريد الإلكتروني لمستلم واحد على الأقل.';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['recipients_failed'] = 'خطأ SMTP: الأخطاء التالية ' .
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'فشل في الارسال لكل من : ';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['recipients_failed'] = 'خطأ SMTP: الأخطاء التالية فشل في الارسال لكل من : ';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['signing'] = 'خطأ في التوقيع: ';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['smtp_connect_failed'] = 'SMTP Connect() غير ممكن.';
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$PHPMAILER_LANG['smtp_error'] = 'خطأ على مستوى الخادم SMTP: ';
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@@ -428,9 +428,11 @@ class PHPMailer
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public $Debugoutput = 'echo';
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/**
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* Whether to keep SMTP connection open after each message.
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* If this is set to true then to close the connection
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* requires an explicit call to smtpClose().
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* Whether to keep the SMTP connection open after each message.
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* If this is set to true then the connection will remain open after a send,
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* and closing the connection will require an explicit call to smtpClose().
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* It's a good idea to use this if you are sending multiple messages as it reduces overhead.
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* See the mailing list example for how to use it.
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*
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* @var bool
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*/
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@@ -748,7 +750,7 @@ class PHPMailer
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*
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* @var string
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*/
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const VERSION = '6.4.1';
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const VERSION = '6.5.0';
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/**
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* Error severity: message only, continue processing.
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@@ -1335,7 +1337,8 @@ class PHPMailer
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if (null === $patternselect) {
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$patternselect = static::$validator;
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}
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if (is_callable($patternselect)) {
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//Don't allow strings as callables, see SECURITY.md and CVE-2021-3603
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if (is_callable($patternselect) && !is_string($patternselect)) {
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return call_user_func($patternselect, $address);
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}
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//Reject line breaks in addresses; it's valid RFC5322, but not RFC5321
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@@ -2182,7 +2185,8 @@ class PHPMailer
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* The default language is English.
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*
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* @param string $langcode ISO 639-1 2-character language code (e.g. French is "fr")
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* @param string $lang_path Path to the language file directory, with trailing separator (slash)
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* @param string $lang_path Path to the language file directory, with trailing separator (slash).D
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* Do not set this from user input!
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*
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* @return bool
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*/
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@@ -2244,14 +2248,32 @@ class PHPMailer
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if (!static::fileIsAccessible($lang_file)) {
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$foundlang = false;
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} else {
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//Overwrite language-specific strings.
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//This way we'll never have missing translation keys.
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$foundlang = include $lang_file;
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//$foundlang = include $lang_file;
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$lines = file($lang_file);
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foreach ($lines as $line) {
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//Translation file lines look like this:
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//$PHPMAILER_LANG['authenticate'] = 'SMTP-Fehler: Authentifizierung fehlgeschlagen.';
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//These files are parsed as text and not PHP so as to avoid the possibility of code injection
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//See https://blog.stevenlevithan.com/archives/match-quoted-string
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$matches = [];
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if (
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preg_match(
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'/^\$PHPMAILER_LANG\[\'([a-z\d_]+)\'\]\s*=\s*(["\'])(.+)*?\2;/',
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$line,
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$matches
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) &&
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//Ignore unknown translation keys
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array_key_exists($matches[1], $PHPMAILER_LANG)
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) {
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//Overwrite language-specific strings so we'll never have missing translation keys.
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$PHPMAILER_LANG[$matches[1]] = (string)$matches[3];
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}
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}
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}
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}
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$this->language = $PHPMAILER_LANG;
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return (bool) $foundlang; //Returns false if language not found
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return $foundlang; //Returns false if language not found
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}
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/**
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@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ class POP3
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*
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* @var string
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*/
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const VERSION = '6.4.1';
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const VERSION = '6.5.0';
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/**
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* Default POP3 port number.
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ class SMTP
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*
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* @var string
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*/
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const VERSION = '6.4.1';
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const VERSION = '6.5.0';
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/**
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* SMTP line break constant.
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@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ class SMTP
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'Amazon_SES' => '/[\d]{3} Ok (.*)/',
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'SendGrid' => '/[\d]{3} Ok: queued as (.*)/',
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'CampaignMonitor' => '/[\d]{3} 2.0.0 OK:([a-zA-Z\d]{48})/',
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'Haraka' => '/[\d]{3} Message Queued \((.*)\)/',
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];
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/**
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